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FREEDOM OF CONTRACT UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
CHARLES BUNN *
A society that relies on private enterprise for most of its food,
clothing, shelter, transportation, and amusement, and for the capital
plant needed to produce them, must evidently allow its private enter-
prisers freedom to act and plan, and to make their plans secure by
contracting with each other. But if the same society thinks about its
underdogs it may endeavor to protect them against unconscionable
contracts brought about by their inferior bargaining position. So in
any legislation (or in any course of judicial decision or administrative
action) about business we are apt to find some things that business men
must do, some others they must not do, and a third group that they
may do if they wish. The size of the three groups, and the importance
of the items that compose them, disclose the state of business freedom
under the laws in question.
The Uniform Commercial Code is not a "regulatory" law. Its
central purpose is not to restrict free contract by imposing required
terms (as e.g., usuary laws, hour and wage laws or public utility laws
necessarily do) but to facilitate commercial transactions by making
the governing law simpler, clearer, more modern, and more uniform.
Nevertheless, like any law at all concerning business, it must consider
in some detail what bargains, in what circumstances, have to be per-
mitted, forbidden, or denied effect. The purpose of this paper is to
examine what the Code has done about these questions.
Forbidden or denied effect. When we speak of freedom of contract
we, mean, I should suppose, not simply freedom to sign papers or
write letters to each other, but freedom to make agreements which
the legal system will enforce. This kind of freedom is restricted not
only by those legal rules which say "You must not make that kind of
promise" but equally by those which say "Even if you make that
kind of promise, it is not enforcible." The abolition of the latter form
of rule in several situations is among the Code's more striking
affirmative contributions to liberty of contract.
THE PARTIES' POWER TO CHOOSE THE APPLICABLE LAW
In any transaction across state or national lines the question
is presented: Which law governs? May that question be determined
by the parties' conscious choice?
* Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School; A.B. 1914, Princeton
University ; LL.B. 1917, Harvard University, Author, Jurisdiction and Practice of the
Courts of the United States (5th ed. 1949).
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Substantial common law authority declares that it may not. The
law itself, not the wishes of the parties, decides which law will govern./
Of course the parties often have not liked that rule. They have
specified which law they have wanted to apply, and quite often
their wishes have prevailed—but not always. The place of contracting,
the place of performance, and the place of trial all have their claims
and one or the other of them may prevail over the parties' choice.
At one time, and for quite a time, drafts of the Code took an
authoritative position in this matter. "Pay no attention to the parties'
choice," it seemed to say. "This is a real good Code. Apply its rules
whenever the Constitution of the United States will let you."2
That made some sense, provided only one was sure that the
Code rules were, for always and for everywhere, the best that could
be written. But suppose, with one end of a transaction in a Code
State, and the other in New York or in Ontario, the parties opted
clearly for the non-code law. Should the Court in the Code state
respect their choice? Has their choice anything to do with what law
governs their transactions? Or is that something for "the law" itself to
settle?
The debate that swirls around these issues T shall not attempt to
summarize. The final Code decision is a clear victory for parties'
choice. With five small and clearly identified exceptions "when a
transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to another
state or nation the parties may agree that the law either of this state
or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights and duties."
And such agreements are effective. It is only "Mailing such agreement"
that "this Act applies to transactions bearing an appropriate relation
to this state."'
This, right or wrong, is a clear and important victory for freedom
of contract, in an area of great importance. For, Code or no Code,
and international legislation or not, no one expects, in finite time, to
see all differences vanish between commercial laws in different places.
As long as there are differences the parties may prefer one to the other,
and if they do, and can agree about it, and their transaction touches
the state or country whose law they want to have apply, the Code says
1 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws §§ 332.1-332.57 (3rd ed. 1935); Restatement, Conflict
of Laws §§ 332-47, 358-72 (1934).
2 UCC § 1.-105 (1948 Printing; Text and Comments Ed., 1950, 1952, 1954). See
Max Rheinstein's detailed and effective criticism of these provisions. Conflict of Laws
in the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 Law & Contemp. Prob. 114 (1951).
3 UCC § 1-105 and comments thereto. It is no secret that the American Law In-
stitute seems likely, in its forthcoming revision of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws,
to accept the same general position as good Conflicts law without a statute. See Restate-
ment (Second), Conflict of Laws §§ 332, 332a (Tentative Draft No. 6, April, 1960).
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they can make their preference effective. This is an important freedom
in all interstate and international transactions.
What are the limits on it?—Clearly the first limit must be that
the choice does not defraud third persons who are not parties nor
privies to the contract.
For example, the manner of a sale or other transfer may be
fraudulent against the seller's creditors, or may require some notice
to them. And since the laws both of fraudulent conveyance and of bulk
sale differ from state to state, it is necessary that the creditors be able
to look to a single state. That state, under the Code as under many
existing statutes and decisions, is the state where the goods are,' and
the parties cannot by contract set aside that rule.'
Similarly, when a seller or lender is asked to extend credit on
the security of personal property, or to extend unsecured credit on a
financial statement which shows the ownership of property, he needs
to know whether the property is already pledged to someone else.
And unless he is to rely entirely on the personal statements of his
debtor, he should know what public office to consult for information.
Accordingly the appropriate Code Article makes valiant efforts to
identify the governing law upon secured transactions' and these rules
also may not be varied by the parties to the secured transaction.'
The other exceptions to the parties' power to choose the applicable
law. are less important. The liability of a bank in the handling of items
is governed by the law of the place where the bank is,g and the validity
of a security by that of the place of organization of the issuer. 9 Both
rules are, no doubt, mainly in the interest of certainty, but both
may have bearing also on the rights of other people (the drawer or
indorsers of the check, the other security holders of the corporation),
and, therefore, neither of them may be varied by the parties. 1 °
FREEDOM TO CONTRACT OUT
SO much for the parties' power to choose among two or more
possibly applicable bodies of law. But consider a different power.
Admitting (or agreeing) that the law of X applies, when may the
parties contract out of such of X's rules as they don't like? Or, using
4 UCC §§ 2-402, 6-102.
5 UCC § 1-105(2).
8 UCC §§ 9-102(1), 9-103. As to the place to look for filings within the proper
state, see § 9-401.
UCC § 1-105(2).
8 UCC 4-102(2).
9 UCC § 8- 106.
10 UCC § 1-105(2).
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the Code's language, when may "the effect of provisions of this Act"
be "varied by agreement"?ll
Lawyers on the continent of Europe have been more clear than
we have on this issue. They have known for a long time the general
distinction between jus dispositivum, the rule that applies unless the
parties agree otherwise, and jus cogens, the binding rule which the
parties cannot set aside by contract. And they have sought, by
provisions in their Codes and otherwise, to make clear which jus was
which. 12
We of course have had exactly the same problems and have, as
usual, dealt with them case by case, in particular compartments of
our thinking, without much general theory. The cases are digested
under such heads as "negligence," "master and servant," "mortgages,"
"public utilities," and so on. Sometimes a statute makes the answer
clear; more often it does not. Our results may be as good as the
civilians'; we do not so often anticipate the problem.
Plainly the draftsmen of the Code could see the problem coming,
and set out to indicate solutions. The indications given fall in three
main classes: (a) "unless otherwise agreed," (b) "this may not be
varied," (c) no express statement in the section either way.
(a) "Unless otherwise agreed," or its equivalent. Many sections
are expressly in this form.' 3 On examination it will be found that most
11 ucc § 1-102(3), 4-103(1), etc.
12 See Lenhoff, Optional Terms (Jus Dispositivum) and Required Terms (Jus
Cogens) in the Law of Contracts, 45 Mich. L. Rev. 39 (1946); Schlesinger, Compara-
tive Law: Cases, Text, Materials, 281 (2d ed. 1959).
la See, e.g., UCC	 1-204(1) (reasonable time), 2-210 (delegation of performance,
assignment of rights), 2-306(2) (obligation imposed by contract for exclusive dealing),
2-307 (delivery in lots), 2-308 (place of delivery), 2-310 (time of payment, etc.),
2-311(2) (specifications), 2-312 (warranties of title and against infringement), 2-314,
2-315, 2-316 (warranties of merchantability and fitness), 2-319 (F.O.B. and F.A.S. terms),
2-320 and 2-321 (C.I.F. and C. & F. terms), 2-322 (delivery "ex-ship"), 2-323 (form
of bill of lading), 2-324 ("no arrival no sale"), 2-325(3) (letter of credit term), 2-326(1)
and 2-327 (sale on approval and sale or return), 2-401 (passage of title), 2-503 (manner
of tender of goods), 2-504 (shipment by seller), 2-507 (effect of seller's tender), 2-509
(risk of loss), 2-511 (tender of payment), 2-513 (buyer's right to inspect goods), 2-514
(when documents deliverable), 2-601 (buyer's rights on improper delivery), 2-615
(excuse by failure of presupposed conditions), 2-706(2) (method of resale by aggrieved
seller), 2-719 (contractual modification of remedies), 2-725(1) (reducing periods of limi-
tation), 3-414(2) (liability of endorsers to each other), 3-506 (time allowed for accept-
ance or payment), 3-802 (effect of instrument on underlying obligation), 4-103(1), (2)
(variation by agreement, bank collections), 4-206 (methods of transfer between banks),
5-106 (time and effect .of establishment of credit), 5-109 (Issuer's obligation to its
customer), 5-110 (availability of credit in portions), 5-111 (warranties on transfer and
presentment), 5-113 (coverage and duration of indemnity), 5-114(2) (Issuer's duty
to honor), 7-204 (warehouseman's liability), 7-302 (through bills of lading), 7-309
(carrier's limitation of liability), 7-507 (warranties on transfer of document of title),
8-208(2) (effect of signature of authenticating trustee, etc.), 8-314 (duty to deliver a
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of them are statements of the usual commercial understanding of
particular terms, or of undertakings normally implied or inferred in
particular transactions. Thus, by Section 2-320 we find that "unless
otherwise agreed . . . the term C.I.F. destination . . . requires the
seller at his own expense and risk to . . ." do five things quite care-
fully described. By Section 2-314 we find that "unless excluded or
modified" a warranty of merchantability is implied in a merchant's
sale of goods. The qualifying language calls attention to the fact that
short-hand terms do not always carry all their usual meanings, nor
particular transactions all their usual inferences, and that when some-
thing departing from the standard is intended it can and ought to be
set out. Sometimes also, as in the case of the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness, the language calls attention to the means
by which the implication can be negatived or varied." And sometimes,
as in the case of limitation of a carrier's liability, it sets limits to the
variance permitted."
"Unless otherwise agreed" and similar words then are flags,
calling attention in that context to the parties' power to vary and some-
times to specify limitations on it. But the words are not essential to
that power. The general rule is that the effect of the Code may be
varied by agreement and the absence of the special flag in any section
does not by itself exempt it from that rule."
(b) "This may not be varied" or the like. The sections carrying
these legends are not many, but they are important." They are
principally for the protection of the party assumed to be the underdog
in bargaining position, or of some third person not a party to the
contract but who may be affected by it. The most important carry
forward principles long known in the law of mortgages and elsewhere.
Thus, as to the underdog, Part 5 of Article 9 deals with default
security), 8-316 (duty to supply proof of authority to transfer), 9-112 (rights where
collateral not owned by debtor), 9-204(3), (5) (after acquired property and future
advances), 9-206 (agreement not to assert defenses against assignee), 9-207 (duties of
secured party in possession of collateral), 9-316 (subordination by agreement), 9-503
(secured party's right to posssession on default), 9-504(2) (surplus or deficiency on
disposition of collateral).
14 UCC § 2-314, 2-315, 2-316.
15 UCC § 7-309. Compare ¢§ 2-718 (liquidated damages and penalties), 2-719
(other modification and limitation of remedies in sales contracts), 9-501 et seq.
(secured party's rights and duties after default).
16 UCC § 1-102(3), (4).
17 See, e.g., UCC § 1-102(3) (general limits on power to vary), 1-105(2) (choice
of law), 1-208 (option to accelerate at will), 2-302 (unconscionable contracts or clauses),
2-718 (liquidated damages and penalties), 2-719 (other variation and limitation of
remedies in sales), 5-116(2), and 9-318(4) (clauses forbidding assignment of rights),
9-501(3)-9-507 (rights of the secured debtor after default).
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under a security agreement, stating the various things that the secured
party may do upon default and certain things he must do. As to the
latter, we find by Section 9-501(3) that the rules stated in certain
carefully identified subsections "may not be waived or varied" except
in stated ways. The most ancient and familiar of the debtor's thus
protected rights, perhaps, is the right of redemption after default.
This, we find by Sections 9-501(3) and 9-506, may not be waived by
him in the security agreement, but may be waived "in writing after
default." The resemblance to the ancient and the modern law of
mortgages is at once perfectly apparent.
A more general provision clearly intended for the protection of
the underdog is in the general section of the Code dealing with variation
by agreement. 18 We there find that
"	 . the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonable-
ness and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed
by agreement but the parties may by agreement determine
the standards by which the performance of such obligations
is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly un-
reasonable."
Again, the resemblance is clear enough to the older principles
against contracts relieving a party in advance from the effects of
his own fraud or negligence. The section does not mean, of course,
that everyone under the Code is required to be always diligent,
reasonable, or careful (he is always required to act in good faith 19 ),
but only that when such requirements are imposed they may not be
disclaimed by an agreement in advance. After breach, the resulting
cause of action (like any other claim or right arising out of any
breach of any contract covered by the Code) can be discharged, even
without consideration, by a proper writing."
A more unusual (in a statute) provision for the underdog, and
certainly a controversial one, is the section giving courts express
authority to refuse enforcement of unconscionable contracts, or of
unconscionable clauses within contracts.'
Any lawyer who has tried many commercial cases knows quite
well that an indispensable element of victory is a conviction in the
18 UCC § 1-102(3).
19 UCC § 1-203.
2° UCC § 1-107.
21 UCC § 2-302. Note that this appears in Article 2, Sales, and so is limited in
application to that context. Why it is so limited I do not know. Certainly the most
striking and important historic application of the principle is the Chancellor's invention
of the equity of redemption, many centuries ago.
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judge's mind that his client's conduct in the matter has been fair and
decent in a moral sense, or at least not indecent. Our culture wants
judges to do justice, and judges want it of themselves, as do juries
—justice, of course, within the law. But the law has many ingenious
devices. So when the conduct or position of one party appears
to be unjust, look out Hard cases often make queer looking law
and even strange findings upon the facts.
The section on unconscionable contracts and clauses brings this
prejudice against injustice out into the open, and at the same time
confines it. If the court as a matter of law (that is to say, the judge
himself, without the jury) finds the contract or clause to have been
unconscionable at the time it was made (and not, that is to say,
merely harsh to one party by reason of what happend later) he may
refuse enforcement, or so limit application as to avoid an uncon-
scionable result. And the determination is to be made in the open, after
proof of "its commercial setting, purpose, and effect." In other words:
do justice, but find out first where justice really lies.
So much for the underdog. Provisions for the protection of
third persons, not parties to the contract but affected by its terms,
are rare in the Code because they are, in general, unnecessary. Lawyers
and judges do not need to be told that contracts bind only the parties
to them and their privies, and that other people are not subject to
have the rules of law changed to their detriment by agreements to
which they have not given their consent.
At one time the Code contained an express statement of this
obvious proposition.' As it stood in Supplement No. 1 of 1955 this
provision read:
"The rights and duties of a third party may not be adversely
varied by an agreement to which he is not a party or by
which he is not otherwise bound, except as otherwise provided
in this Act; . . . "
The staff of the New York Law Revision Commission reported that
this provision
"may be self-evident or unnecessary but in itself it is cer-
tainly correct under New York law and elsewhere."'
The Commission itself reported its belief "that this clause accomplishes
nothing."' In 1956 the sponsors' Editorial Board deleted it "as un-
22 11CC 5 I-102(3)(b) (1952, 1954 and Supplement No. 1, 1955).
23 New York Law Revision Commission, Study of Uniform Commercial Code,
Article 1, General Provisions, Legislative Document No. 65(B), p. 23 (1955).
24 Report of the New York Law Revision Commission to the Legislature (1956),
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necessary."" So the meaning is perfectly clear: the Code does not
intend in this respect to change the ordinary law of contracts.
The principle stated has application everywhere in the commercial
law. For example, the buyer of a negotiable instrument, to become
a holder in due course, must take it, among other things, without
notice of existing defenses." Suppose that the buyer and seller of a
note agreed, varying the effect of this provision, that the buyer
"shall be deemed a holder in due course" although he did have notice.
Judges do not need to be told that the maker's available defense is
not cut off by any such provision.
Or again, suppose a merchant and his finance company, in an
assignment of accounts receivable, agreed that "this assignment is
perfected without filing." 27 No one would think this clause effective
against, say, a lien creditor without notice of the assignment."
Many such cases can be stated. In most of them the point is
obvious, so obvious that in the. end both the New York Law Revision
Commission and the sponsors' Editorial Board thought express state-
ment of it was unnecessary. One can only hope that the business men
who are subject to the Code and the lawyers and judges who advise
them and adjudicate their controversies will see the point as clearly.
In a few places particular applications of the principle are still
expressly carried in the Code, because, as to them, the point was not
quite so obvious. Thus by Section 2-318 we learn that the seller's
warranties of quality and fitness, whatever they may be, extend to
members of the buyer's household and his guests within limitations
stated. And "a seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this
section." This is so, no doubt, because, without it, it would at least
be arguable that guests and members of the household are privies of
the head of the house, and so capable of being bound by his agreements.
Whether right or not, that argument is negatived by the express pro-
vision.
More important, no doubt, because covering more cases, are the
limitations on the parties' power to choose the applicable law in
interstate and international transactions." The main reason for these
limitations, as pointed out above, is that third persons, especially
Relating to the Uniform Commercial Code, Legislative Document No. 65, p. 23
(1956).
25 Recommendations of the Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code 1, 3
(1956).
26 NIL 4 52(4), UCC	 3-302(1)(c).
27 See, UCC § 9-302(1).
28 See, UCC	 9-301(1)(b), (3).
28 UCC § 1-105(2).
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present or future creditors of one or the other of the parties, should
not have their rights affected by the parties' choice of law.
In one place, and, so far as I have found, in one place only, the
Code makes agreements binding on people who have not assented
to them. In the Article on Bank Deposits and Collections'we find that
"Federal Reserve Regulations and operating letters, clearing
house rules, and the like, have the effect of agreements .. .
whether or not specifically assented to by parties interested in
items handled."" [Emphasis supplied.]
This means, for instance, that if a clearing house rule fixed the time
within which an item must be returned, "or be considered paid," the
rule would bind all parties, although neither the drawer of the check
nor the depositor nor the intermediate indorsers knew anything about
it. This, plainly, is a rule not of ordinary contract law but of con-
venience and efficiency in the check collection process. Whether
right or not in that connection, it is clearly not the general position.
(c) No express statement in the Section as to whether that Section
can be varied. This is the commonest of the three cases. Most of the
sections of the Code say nothing either way on the parties' power
or lack of it to contract out.
To all these many sections the general rule of Article 1 applies:"
"The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by
agreement, except as otherwise provided in this Act, and
except that the obligations of good faith, diligence, reason-
ableness and care (when) prescribed by this Act may not be
disclaimed by agreement. . . ."
The limitations on this freedom have been discussed above. The
affirmative clear area of freedom is enormous.
NEW FREEDOMS TO MAKE EFFECTIVE CONTRACTS
Whether or not there is honor among thieves without resort to
law, the business community requires, from time to time, enforcement of
business promises by law. So when freedom of contract is mentioned in
a business context, one supposes that the freedom meant is not simply
to make promises or take them, but to make them legally effective.
This requirement our existing commercial law satisfies, in
general, quite well. But there are some spots, in the law on considera-
tion, essential terms, certainty, and the Statute of Frauds, where the
3° UCC 4-103(2).
31 UCC § 1-102(3).
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reasonable expectations of the party seeking to enforce the other
party's promise are sometimes disappointed.
The Code does not abolish either the general requirement of
consideration or certainty or the requirement of a writing when the
Statute of Frauds applies. But it does contain revisions in all three
areas which will measurably increase business freedom to make
effective promises. Moreover, Article 9, on secured transactions,
makes several kinds of security effective that were not so before.
(a) Consideration —Offers, as we all know, are generally re-
vocable in our law until they are accepted. If they are to be irrevocable,
that is, to become options, something must be paid for the promise to
hold them open.
This is, no doubt, all very well in general. But sometimes buyers
or sellers, giving or receiving offers upon goods which are part of a
larger plan, want to have the offer firm until the larger plan is either
tied up or abandoned. So, quite often, offers to buy and sell are made
which say that they are firm for a stated limited time, or until some
event occurs or doesn't. And, almost as often, when no lawyer is
consulted, and the trade is not one in which regular options are
customary, no one thinks to pay or to demand separate consideration
for the firmness. So that promise is not binding. 32
No one, of course, ever needs to make an offer firm unless he
wants to. But if he does want to, in a business context, there seems
to be no good reason why he should not be able to. In any case,
the Code provides that merchants' offers to buy or sell goods, made in
signed writings which say that they are firm for limited times, are
firm for the time stated, not greater than three months."
Another frequent business situation is that of the existing con-
tract which turns out, as time passes, to become so burdensome against
one party that the two agree to change it.
Of course no one is under legal obligation to consent to modify
an existing binding contract merely because of great deflation or
inflation, of threats of war or sudden peace, or other changes in
demand or in supply. But often business people, facing default upon
the other side in such a situation, are quite willing to agree to change
the contract.
When they do so, what is the consideration for the change? If
they consult their lawyers they will no doubt learn that the most
effective plan is to cancel the existing contract altogether, and start
32 1 Williston, Contracts § 61 (Rev. ed. 1936); 1 Corbin, Contracts §§ 42, 44, 46
(1950); Restatement, Contracts H 35, 46, 47 (1932).
UCC § 2-205.
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again from scratch. But unless their lawyers tell them that, they are
most unlikely to proceed that way at all. Much more likely they will
write each other letters, or both sign a single paper, changing some of
the terms only. And if the changes that they make are all one way,
one of them is likely to discover later that the changes made are
ineffective, since they lack consideration."
This also the Code changes. Buyers and sellers of goods may
change their contracts if they want to. "An agreement modifying a
contract within this Article needs no consideration to be binding.""
Other modifications of the requirement of consideration are made
elsewhere in the Code, one of them returning to a decision of Lord
Mansfield." The net effect is a material increase of the freedom of
business men to make binding contracts if they want to.
(b) Essential Terms.—Is a contract of sale binding which does
not fix the price? Most lawyers, and most courts, would say at once:
of course not, unless some workable standard is provided by which
price can be determined. If it is left at large, to be fixed later by
agreement of the parties, or by one of them alone, there cannot be a
contract. For how can the court fix damages without the essential
term?
No doubt in very many cases this lawyer's view agrees entirely
with commercial understanding. If I am selling, say, at one extreme
100 shares of General Motors common or, at the other, a unique
work of art, I am unlikely to think that I have made a deal until the
price is settled. But suppose what I am selling is 18,000 carburators,
more or less, of one design, to be delivered over a year's time, and
both the hourly wages that I pay and the cost of brass, etc., that I must
buy are subject to be changed within the year in ways that I cannot pre-
dict. I may not be willing to offer a firm price for the year, or if I am it
may be so high that my buyer will not like it. But if he and I both
want to make a deal it is entirely possible that we may make what we
both think is a firm contract at, e.g., "seller's prices in effect at the date
of each delivery," or some other equally vague words.
Whether we have really made a contract when we do that is
most doubtful under present law." The Code says that we have if we
84 1 Williston, op. cit. supra note 32, §5 130, 130A; 1 Corbin, op. cit. supra note
32, § 175; Restatement, Contracts §§ 76, 78 (1932).
35 UCC I 2-209(1).
86 UCC 15 1-107, 5-105. With the latter, compare PiHans and Rose v. Van Mierop
and Hopkins, 3 Burr. 1663, 97 Eng. Rep. 1035 (K.B. 1765).
37 1 Williston, op. cit, supra note 32, §5 37, 41, 45; 1 Corbin, op. cit. supra note
32, §5 95, 97, 98; Restatement, Contracts § 32 (1932).
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have so intended38
 and goes on to provide how the actual price is to
be determined in various situations. (In the case put above, the language
means the seller's price in effect at the date of each delivery as fixed by
the seller in good faith!")) Here again the Code increases freedom to
make binding contracts when the parties want to do so.
(c) Statute of Frauds.—It is of course no news that informal
memoranda of transactions, although duly signed by the party to be
charged, often omit some material term of the agreement and so fail
to satisfy the Statute." In the view taken by the sponsors of the
Code this is likely, often, to defeat reasonable expectations even though
it is quite clear that a contract was made.
Accordingly, the requirements of the Statute are relaxed. By
Section 2-201(1) a signed writing satisfies the Statute if it is "sufficient
to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties,"
and specifies a quantity of goods. Price, quality, warranties, time and
place of delivery or payment—any of these may be omitted. (They can
be supplied, of course, by oral evidence: the office of the writing is to
"afford a basis for believing that the offered oral evidence rests on a
real transaction. I ) 41
Suppose also, what is not uncommon in some trades, that the
only writing is a confirmation of an oral contract, mailed by one party
to the other and to which no reply is made. The confirmation satisfies
the Statute as against the man that sent it, but how about the other?
He has signed no writing, and so he is not bound. 42
The Code thinks this is wrong. Confirmations are a perfectly
good way of recording oral contracts, and it is easy enough to protest
if the stated terms are incorrect. Accordingly, between merchants the
confirmation satisfies the Statute as against the party who receives it
"unless written notice of objection to its contents is given within ten
days after it is received."" That should make possible a just result
when the court or jury are convinced that there really was a contract.
(d) Agreements for Security.—This is not the time or place to
set out the many changes which the Code's Article 9 makes in the law
governing secured transactions. But an article on freedom of contract
cannot end without reference to some of the provisions which make
38 UCC § 2-305; compare § 2-204(3).
ss UCC § 2-305(2). And note that in this Article 2, Sales, this includes "the ob-
servance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." § 2-103(1)(b).
40 2 Williston, op. cit. supra note 32, §§ 569-78; 2 Corbin, op. cit. supra note 32,
U 498-501, 505-06; Restatement, Contracts § 207 (1932).
41 UCC 2 -201(1) and comment 1.
42 2 Williston, op. cit. supra note 32, § 586; 2 Corbin, op. cit. supra note 32,
§§ 523 -24; Restatement, Contracts § 211 (1932).
UCC § 2 -201(2); for a like rule in the securities business, see § 8
-319(c).
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possible effective security agreements where, in many States, they
were not possible before."
IN SUMMARY
This is indeed, a miscellaneous list of changes in the law. But a
fair general statement of their impact is quite simple: the Code tries
hard to make sensible distinctions between the freedoms which it
grants and those which it restricts, and in result increases, at many
points of material importance, the real freedom of the parties to
make binding and effective contracts if they wish. ,
44 E,g,o UCC 44 9-204(3) (after acquired property), 9-204(5) (future advances),
9-205 (use or disposition of collateral without accounting).
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